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Exactly 50 years ago, in 1964, a landmark
article whose two-word title, “Strong infer-
ence,” revealed little and evoked plenty,
appeared in the hallowed pages of Science
(Platt, 1964). Simply stated, Platt’s view of
scientific research in its highest form pro-
ceeds through three steps: development
of alternative hypotheses; design of cru-
cial experiments to exclude one or more
hypotheses; execution of careful studies to
obtain clear-cut results. It was a powerful
reminder of how problem solving can be
performed, written in a style both infor-
mal and authoritative. In those days it was
not unusual for the most prestigious sci-
entific outlets to publish articles whose
language seems to nowadays have been rel-
egated to blog posts. Just seven years ear-
lier, another Science paper had appeared
with a whimsical title, “Biological clock
in the unicorn” (Cole, 1957), addressing
the excessive reliance on statistical anal-
ysis of cycles and correlations that was
plaguing the biologists of the time. Among
the many citable passages in either one of
those articles, one may dwell on a segment
in Platt’s text: “Whether it is hand-waving
or number-waving or equation-waving, a
theory is not a theory unless it can be dis-
proved. That is, unless it can be falsified
by some possible experimental outcome.”
Literal interpretations of such statements,
especially when translated to all possible
scientific research, are problematic, and
Platt’s impact is best described as “more
an inspirational tract than the develop-
ment of a formal scientific methodology”
(Davis, 2006). It is in that vein that I
decided to open this Grand Challenge edi-
torial by evoking a paper from half a
century earlier.
Paleoecology, as any other branch of
retrospective science, does not easily lend
itself to experimentation. Not because of
any fault of its own, but simply because
there is no experimental outcome capable
of reversing the unidirectionality of time.
Elsewhere (Biondi, 2013) I have explored
the tension created by the imperative to
understand ecosystem legacies and past
environmental drivers against the impos-
sibility of distinguishing between true
and false when dealing with the past.
As it turned out, I was partly rephras-
ing the meaning of “historicity,” i.e., “the
necessity of working with complex and
unique events in time” (Gould, 1980).
In the same vein, but even earlier, Nagel
(1952) had discussed in detail the dis-
tinction and connections between the
“nomothetic” aspects of science, “which
seek to establish abstract general laws for
indefinitely repeatable processes,” and the
“idiographic” ones, “which aim to under-
stand the unique and nonrecurrent.” These
issues cut across the timescales used by
Jackson (2001) to distinguish between
“real time” (for modern ecology), “Q-
time” (for Quaternary ecology), and “deep
time” (for paleobiology and paleontology,
which is the subject of another section of
this journal).
Prescribing, even more than describ-
ing, the type of research that this journal
section is aiming to attract and publish
requires some epistemological considera-
tions. Science is a method for reducing
uncertainty (Lindley, 2006): thus, pale-
oecology could be considered a method
for reducing uncertainty about past eco-
logical patterns and processes. A subdi-
vision into preliminary, exploratory, and
confirmatory research has been proposed
(Flueck and Brown, 1993), although the
last term suggests an inherent bias, as
even “validation” and “verification” are
not truly possible when dealing with open
systems (Oreskes et al., 1994). Choice
of words notwithstanding, the most pro-
ductive approach to science was demon-
strated recently by the insightful views
on exploratory vs. confirmatory research
made by Wagenmakers et al. (2012) with
regard to psychology—another discipline
where experimentation is rarely an option.
What they define as confirmatory is in fact
the type of rigorous scientific inquiry that
begins with a priori definitions of expected
outcomes. This practice is diametrically
opposed to a posteriori analyses and ratio-
nalizations that are inevitably more influ-
enced by investigator’s bias. Their language
is explicit, as in stating that “In fact, the
advice to torture the data until they confess
is not wrong—just as long as this torture
is clearly acknowledged in the research
report.”
For clarity, I have found useful to cat-
egorize studies as (a) experimental, which
are performed under controlled condi-
tions in a laboratory or in the field with
random assignment of treatments to sub-
jects; (b) observational, when conditions
are not entirely controlled or the assign-
ment of treatments to subjects is not
random; (c) iterative, whereby no treat-
ments are possible, but a specific question
is asked a priori and constantly refined
by comparing predictions with outcomes
(e.g., forecasting, opinion polls); (d) mon-
itoring, when questions may not exist or
are asked a posteriori (e.g., surveys, inven-
tories, proxy reconstructions, data min-
ing, remote sensing, cartography, auto-
mated recording). It is better to envisage
these categories as part of a continuum
rather than as discrete entities, so that at
one end of the spectrum are experiments,
and at the other end are observations
designed to obtain descriptive measures
of natural phenomena without includ-
ing control units or manipulation of any
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sort. All research activities, including those
labeled as “monitoring,” can lead to scien-
tific discoveries, as repeatedly shown in the
atmospheric sciences (e.g., Keeling, 1960),
forestry (e.g., Schreuder and Thomas,
1991), and epidemiology (e.g., Goldstein
and Goldstein, 1984).
A large body of literature on what sep-
arates an experimental from an observa-
tional study can be found in the medical
field. A typical example is the link between
smoking and disease, which could not
be established experimentally. In observa-
tional studies “the investigator is restricted
to taking selected observations or mea-
surements that seem appropriate for the
objectives, either by gathering new data
or using those already collected by some-
one else” (Cochran, 1983; p. 2). Cochran’s
book, which was published posthumously
and mostly written before 1980, is widely
recognized as a classic reference. Estimates
from an observational study are likely
to be biased, not because of the inves-
tigator’s shortcomings but because of
potential differences in starting condi-
tions, which make responses not compa-
rable. Such confounding can easily mis-
lead researchers, as shown by Simpson’s
paradox, whereby a medical treatment
that is judged beneficial for all is also
detrimental for both men and women
(Lindley, 2006). A prominent role is there-
fore assigned to minimizing bias using
three general methods: (1) refinement of
techniques through devices, (2) blocking
and matching, and (3) statistical adjust-
ments (Cochran, 1983). Updated mono-
graphs on this topic (Rosenbaum, 2002,
2010) have emphasized that without treat-
ments neither experimental nor observa-
tional studies can be performed. A list of
procedures for improving research quality
was provided by Rosenbaum (2010; pp. 5–
7), but studies of past ecological changes
are rarely able to meet these expectations.
In fact, all retrospective investigations
fall in the “monitoring” category men-
tioned above because of the impossibility
of either applying specific treatments, thus
preventing experimental or observational
investigations, or of using future outcomes
to measure model skill, hence excluding
an iterative approach. Although not nec-
essarily a hierarchy for discovery poten-
tial, the study categories mentioned above
are still in descending order for likelihood
of raucous debate. As we transition from
experiments to, for instance, proxy recon-
structions of climate, there is a greater
and greater chance that studies address-
ing the same questions but conducted by
different investigators will provide con-
flicting results. Clever strategies have been
proposed to circumvent and ameliorate
some of these issues in an earth system
science (ESS) modeling framework (e.g.,
Hughes and Ammann, 2009). On the other
hand, any working scientist is well aware
of the fact that results based on statis-
tical correlations or simulation models,
however complex they may be, are not
necessarily harbingers of cause-effect rela-
tionships. In Fanelli (2010)’s words, “the
nature of hypotheses tested and the logical
and methodological rigor employed to test
them vary systematically across disciplines
and fields, depending on the complexity of
the subject matter and possibly other fac-
tors (e.g., a field’s level of historical and/or
intellectual development).”
The purposely bare-bone taxonomy of
scientific studies mentioned above has a
biological perspective, but in a geophysics
framework one would be confronted with
the “forward” and “inverse” problem of
linking data with underlying processes
(Snieder and Trampert, 1999). A simi-
lar concept emerges when using a “state-
space” approach, whereby “hidden” or
“latent” variables are responsible for gen-
erating the observations (Harvey, 1990).
Paleo reconstructions, and in general any
proxy-record study, can be considered
an inverse problem because incomplete
information is used to infer the underly-
ing parameters and processes (the “true”
model) that generated them. However, it
is an ill-posed inverse problem, because it
has no unique solution, and small errors in
the data cause large changes in the inferred
explanation (King, 1997). The various
assumptions made by the investigator to
make sampling decisions, to account for
measurement errors, to select theoretical
probability distributions, to perform data
reduction steps, etc. are needed to approx-
imate a solution, but different approaches
and options easily lead to diverging results
(Biondi, 2014). The mission statement of
the Paleoecology section outlines research
topics that are pressing and essential in
scope, but the major challenge for the
field may be to remain well grounded in
what can and cannot be accomplished.
When investigating the past, and report-
ing research results, it is then appropriate
to remind ourselves that we cannot prove
hypotheses, and rather accept that some
of them have not yet been proven false
(Kinraide and Denison, 2003).
Another insightful argument was made
by Cleland (2002) concerning scientific
disciplines that attempt to predict the
future and those that focus on postdic-
tion of the past. The former proceed “from
causes (test conditions) to effects, with the
concomitant worries about ruling out false
positives and false negatives,” while the
latter go “from effects (traces) to causes,
with the concomitant worries about ruling
out alternative explanations.” A “predictive
science” is therefore confronted with “the
underdetermination of the future by the
localized present,” whereas a “postdictive
science” deals with “the overdetermina-
tion of the past by the localized present.”
As argued by Pigliucci (2005), “the price
for our ability to predict the future is
that we can do so accurately only under
very restrictive conditions,” while accurate
inferences about a past event can in some
cases be derived using more than one type
of empirical evidence. The main conse-
quence of this asymmetry is that historical
sciences tend to accumulate evidence in
support of a hypothesis, rather than trying
to disprove it.
Paleoecology cannot be segregated
from the rest of ecological science (Rull,
2010), but its philosophical character-
ization as a postdictive field of study
provides a useful frame of reference,
particularly when confronted with the
emphasis increasingly being placed on all-
encompassing simulations models (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 2006). A more effective
approach was laid out in Harte’s (2002)
inspirational article on ESS: “There is, in
ESS, a growing infatuation with ever more
complex models. It’s gotten to the point
where some models look as inscrutable as
nature itself. With numerous adjustable
parameters, these models are generally
unfalsifiable, so that the opportunity to
learn from a wrong prediction is short-
circuited. A “Fermi approach” based on
models that capture the essence of the
problem, but not all the details, might get
us farther. We need to develop simple,
mechanistic models. They will, perforce,
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be caricatures of the Earth system, but
they must be falsifiable.” It may not be too
farfetched to infer that Platt’s approach
reverberates in Harte’s words, as well as in
the prominence assigned to manipulation
for distinguishing ecology from natural
history (e.g., Ernest et al., 2009).
Science is a relatively young enterprise,
as it emerged in its modern form at
the time of Galileo, about 400 years ago.
Even younger is the systematic study of
uncertainty, which only dates back about
a century (Lindley, 2006). These time-
frames are miniscule compared to those
during which humans have behaved as
“political animals,” using Aristotle’s def-
inition. To protect the infancy of scien-
tific thought, especially given the nature
of “postdictive” research, formal training
in how to detect and reduce bias should
be an essential component of graduate
curricula in paleoecology, with the papers
by Wunsch (2010) and Jackson (2012)
among the required readings. With regard
to this journal section, it is expected to
value and attract studies of past ecolog-
ical changes that foster analytical rigor
and constant innovation, to provide an
outlet where intellectual creativity and
discovery-oriented efforts are wholeheart-
edly embraced, and to become an arena
where vigorous debate on fundamental
assumptions is allowed as long as it relies
on evidence-based worldviews, thereby
keeping in line with the principles that
inspired Galileo’s revolution.
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